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

Total area of island: 30,000 sq. kms.
East Timor: 14,935 sq. kms.
Population of E.Timor: 650,000

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IDOC BULLETIN
n. 38 – December 1975

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IDOC Secretary General, Mark Reuver
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EAST TIMOR

On November 28, 1975, the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of Timor (Fretilin) unilaterally proclaimed the independence of the former Portuguese territory in S.E. Asia. This decision came after months of uncertainty and crisis which at some time almost degenerated into a tragedy. The tragedy came ten days later, on December 7, 1975, when Indonesian troops supported by heavy bombings landed near the capital city of the new state, Dili. Heavy fighting and a high toll of casualty were reported to near-by Australia. Fretilin forces who escaped the massacre retreated to the mountain area. Indonesian troops and the Indonesian-supported political parties are now reported in control of the island.

The present issue of the IDOC Bulletin tries to provide some background documentation on the Timorese situation.

East Timor: A Portuguese Colony.

from "Timor Information Service", *Melbourne, Australia, 11 November 1975.*

The Island of Timor is located at the south eastern extremity of the Nusatenggara Archipelago (Lesser Sundas). The Portuguese landed in Timor in 1520 in pursuit of the sandalwood trade. The Dutch later established themselves on the Western half of the island, for similar reasons. The map above shows the areas of the Portuguese Colony usually called East Timor, and the ex-Dutch Colony, now called Indonesian Timor. This was incorporated in the Republic of Indonesia in 1949. Included in the 650,000 people in East Timor are some 10,000 Chinese and 6,000 other non-Timorese who are mainly Portuguese Colonial administrators and soldiers. The original inhabitants were of Melanesian stock speaking a language with branches in New Guinea. During colonial conquest they were forced into the central mountains where their descendants now live. Originally the island was wealthy, as the hereditary chiefs, called liurais, conducted a trade in sandalwood with Chinese and Arab traders. The Portuguese took over this trade and the sandalwood stands were ruthlessly exploited for profit. They no longer exist. Dili, the main town and seaport of East Timor is 600 kms from Darwin. Australia has provided East Timor with its major communication and air link with the outside world.

The 450 years of Portuguese colonial rule has not resulted in 'development' for the Timorese people. 90 % of the indigenous population is still illiterate; health services were concentrated around Dili – there were only 20 doctors for the entire population, 12 of them stationed in Dili; malaria and T.B. are widespread, and al-

most no preventative medicine or immunisations have been established; infant mortality is approx. 50%; 90% of the people live in small hamlets pursuing a subsistence agricultural life, using traditional techniques; the only existing 3 miles of sealed road are in the capital; there is little secondary industry.

Timorese exports are coffee, copra and rubber. Imports are food products, chemicals and machinery. Coffee earned 90% of foreign exchange, but very few Timorese benefited from this. 40% of coffee production was in the hands of a single Portuguese firm, and the bulk of the rest was in the hands of Chinese. Commerce in East Timor has been dominated by Chinese traders. Of the 25 largest firms, 23 were owned by Chinese and 2 by Portuguese. Out of 300 shops, only 1 or 2 were in the hands of Timorese.

The Timorese villagers have existed on their own food crops of rice, corn and cassava. The average per capita income is about A$30 p.a. Imported foodstuffs such as flour and sugar have been primarily for the urban population. Each male Timorese over the age of 18 had to pay a fixed yearly tax. If he couldn't save the tax from subsistence level labour, then he had to work it off, generally on the roads, resulting in a further loss in living standards. About 10% of the children had the opportunity to go to school, but the language of instruction was Portuguese. Very few Timorese speak Portuguese. The major dialect is Tetum. A few Timorese have been educated at the high school in Dili and the University in Lisbon under a colonial policy to produce a Portuguese orientated elite.

From former Portuguese governor Afonso de Castro's book As Possesoes Portuguesas na Oceania, *Lisbon, 1867:*

Three missionaries are quite sufficient for the type of work which is now being undertaken; but in order to spread Christianity and convert to our holy religion the thousands of pagans who live on this island, three is too little. Religious education is a great medium of civilisation and in Timor where we lack and will continue to lack the power to dominate these people, we must use words to conquer what cannot be conquered by the sword. Through religious education we founded a colony; through religious education we must maintain it.

... For a Timorese, to be a Christian means to be a subject of His Majesty the King of Portugal and this is the important point politically. All things considered, and regardless of preconceptions, religious conversions in Timor have more political than religious significance. Portugal acquired subjects but the Church did not increase its following since most of those converted were Christians in name only.

Quoted in Abilio de Araujo, Timorese Elites, *Canberra, Australia, 1975, p. 4 (IDOC 06719)*

25 April, 1974

The April, 1974 coup in Portugal took Timor by surprise. Apart from the recall of the DGS (secret police) the coup in Lisbon had little impact on the administration. There were no immediate sackings; Government officials continued to occupy their leading positions in Dili. However, the administration did announce that as part of the Armed Forces Movement policy of decolonisation the Portuguese presence in East Timor would be phased out as soon as possible.

Political Developments

By June, 1974 three political groups had formed – The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), the Association of Timorese Social Democrats (ASDT) which later became the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN) and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (APODETI).

UDT was made up of Portuguese/Timorese higher-level administration workers, Chinese merchants and backed by the large coffee plantation owners. Initially, they sought self-determination for the Timorese but orientated toward a federation with Portugal, with an intermediary stage before attainment of independence. Until August, 1975, UDT maintained an apparent rigid opposition to any integration with Indonesia. Initially they had some widespread support, but this dwindled by March, 1975 to about 10-15% and that in areas of greatest Portuguese contact.

APODETI, the smallest of the parties wanted Timor to integrate with Indonesia. Apodeti had very few supporters, in fact, there has always been widespread suspicion of Indonesians amongst East Timorese.

FRETILIN arose out of the Committee for Defence of Labour, which sprang up immediately after the Portuguese Coup and quickly won a 50% pay rise for lower administration workers – a rise to 25 escudos (approx. 70 cents A) per day in Dili and 20 in the rest of the island. This first strike in Timor's history was led and organised by Jose Ramos Horta, the present secretary of FRETILIN's political committee. The FRETILIN program is for unity of all Timorese patriots, decolonisation and independence with a transformation of colonial structures to enable progress and development of the East Timorese people. FRETILIN appears to have quickly won large popular support. In March, 1975, it had 200,000 registered members. It has initiated a comprehensive program of social improvement: a literacy program, using Paulo Freire methods and a booklet written in Tetum, which after 6 months had 200 centres operating; organised a national union of students, a workers union and a number of agricultural co-operatives.

In December 1974, when it became clear that Portugal was insistent on decolonisation, UDT formed a coalition with FRETILIN with the common ground of independence against the pro-Indonesian stance of APODETI.

(IDOC 06717)

Indonesia's Policy

In June 1974, Ramos Horta, the secretary of FRETILIN (the party that wants independence and enjoys the majority support), visited Jakarta where the received assurances from Adam Malik (Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs) that Indonesia would respect East Timor's independence.

In a letter to Horta Malik said, among other things: "In our view, these developments (the change in regime in Lisbon) offered a good opportunity to the people of Timor to accelerate the process towards independence, ad well as to generate overall national development and to promote the progress of the people of Timor". The letter went on to say "The Government of Indonesia until now still adheres to the following principles:

1) the independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people in Timor.

2) the Government as well as the people of Indonesia have no intention to increase or expand their territory, or to occupy other territories other than what is stipulated in their Constitution. This reiteration is to give you a clear idea, so that there may be no doubt in the minds of the people of Timor in expressing their own wishes.

3) for this reason, whoever will govern in Timor in the future after independence, can be assured that the Government of Indonesia will always strive to maintain good relations, friendship and cooperation for the benefit of both countries".

from an Australian Report (IDOC 06696)

Indonesia's Propaganda War

After Australian Prime Minister Whitlam's visit to Indonesia in September, 1974, Radio Kupang (from Indonesian Timor) beamed broadcasts to East Timor denouncing the FRETILIN party as communist and their coalition partners UDT as being worse than the Portuguese fascists.

Finally Radio Kupang claimed that it would be better for East Timor to join Indonesia. The press has been banned altogether from Indonesia's half of Timor.

"Berita Yuda" (the Indonesian army newspaper) and *"Sinar Harapan"* carried stories about Chinese communist agitation in East Timor and stated that a Communist Chinese general had flown from Canberra to East Timor to direct operations. This is patently nonsense as the Chinese community in East Timor is pro-Taiwan and there is a Taiwan consulate there. At the end of November. Adam Malik declared that there were only two options for East Timor: to go with Indonesia or to go with Portugal. But the latter course was unacceptable and this would mean extending colonialism. Thus, East Timor should become part of Indonesia. When Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Willissee, indicated his disagreeement, Adam Malik denied he had said it.

In February this year *"Antara"* (the official Indonesian government newsagency) claimed that de facto authority had been practically taken over by left wing groups in East Timor using threats. On the 27th, they claimed communists were stirring uo a hate Indonesia campaign and that hundreds had fled to Indonesian Timor in the face of terror. Simultaneously, the *"New Standard"* sponsored by General Ali Murpato (who engineered the West Irian affair and who is supposed to be handling the East Timor affair) stated: "The area which is small and weak will easily fall prey to power plays of the great powers. The adoption of integration into Indonesia might be the best solution for the implementation of the decolonialisation". On March 2, Adam Malik said: "The Indonesian Government will not stand back if the people of Portuguese Timor are subjected to terror". These statements seem to have been accompanied by preparations for invasion.

At least 100 of the refugees that Indonesia speaks of going to Atambua were sent by the Atsabe chief who is in APODETI (the party which supports integration of East Timor into Indonesia). These people were sent for the purpose of guerilla training to cause disturbances when they return to East Timor. An Australian delegation which recently returned from East Timor met this chief, who is being held prisoner, and found that he did not know much about the situation, eg. he didn't even know the policies of the two major political parties: FRETILIN and UDT. There is much evidence to show that it is Indonesia that is responsible for the threats and the tension in East Timor.

Grant Evans had private communication that in November 1974 100 Indonesian army and 100 airforce troops were moved to Lombok to infiltrate East Timor. When Ramos Horta, FRETILIN's secretary, was in Australia he mentioned that there was an abnormally large number of Indonesian "tourists" in East Timor. Recently, there were reports that Indonesian marines were carrying out amphibious exercises and that a military intelligence group with the code name "Operasi Komodo" was working in Timor. Just before March 11, Evans received a telegram from Ramos Horta: "Indonesian troops, about 3,000 are in border military exercises. Urge U.N. supervision. Our position is independence or death. Shalom".

On the day that invasion reports appeared in Australian papers, the Indonesian consul in Dili boasted that he could call in Indonesian troops within 48 hours. Within two days, photos on the display board at the Indonesian consulate changed to show photos of Indonesian military equipment. This was later wrecked. Evans suggests that this may have been done by the consulate staff to give further proof of left wing terrorism.

Further evidence of Indonesian intimidation was related on Lateline on ABC radio on March 24, when members of the delegation described how the sound of

gunfire opens Radio Kupang's programmes that are beamed into East Timor. Also there have been threats that Indonesia will take revenge in those who don't support APODETI. The "*National U*" claims that Indonesian fishing boats have been smuggling arms into East Timor and that the Indonesian Navy is patrolling close to the shores.

Ten years ago, Whitlam said Australia wouldn't have a friend if it supported the Portuguese domination of East Timor. However, he now seems to support the Indonesian domination of East Timor. It was after Whitlam's visit to Indonesia last September that Indonesia began its intimidation of East Timor. Many observers see his statements: that an independent East Timor would be "unviable" and "a potential threat to the stability of the region" and that he favoured integration into Indonesia "if this was agreed by the people" as giving Suharto the "green light" for invasion. (Mungo MacCallum in the "*Nation Review*" 28.2.75, claims that the transcripts of the conversations between Whitlam and Suharto were destroyed when the crisis reached the headlines). On top of this, Willesee discoutaged a Parliamentary delegation from going to East Timor and described Ramos Horta as being "alarmist". This could be construed as being conciliatory to Indonesia.

from "Retrieval", *newsletter of current events, Fitzroy, Australia*

(IDOC 05753)

The Independence Movements From Coalition To Conflict

Excepts from an Australian Report dated 8 September 1975

In late **January** the leaders of Fretilin and UDT agreed to set up a coalition as a move to rationalize the common elements in their approaches to independence. In its subsequent communique, the coalition declared that Fretilin and UDT were the "legitimate representative of the people of East Timor". The formation of the coalition had the support of the Portuguese authorities, particularly of Major Mota, the chief political officer and leading Armed Forces Movement (AFM) representative, and Major Jonatas, who were seeking to establish a national front as a vehicle to facilitate the process of decolonization...

The press reports in late **February** that an Indonesian military seizure of East Timor was imminent seemed to provide the UDT/Fretilin coalition with an opportunity for further consolidation. Indeed, the coalition promptly sent a cable to Mr. Andrew Peacock, the Opposition Spokesman on Foreign Affairs of Australia, stating: "Coalition Fretilin/UDT holding over 95% Timor's population calls your support independence East Timor. Australia has great responsability maintenance peace this geographical area thus to prevent any conflict. Coalition is prepared start talks Australian-Indonesia government for cooperation towards peace political stability in Southeast Asia"...

Some time in **March** there seems to have been a significant change in Indonesian policy towards East Timor. The propaganda campaign began to diminish and Timorese leaders from the coalition party were invited to visit Jakarta for talks with Indonesian leaders.

In April and May tensions in relations between Indonesia and East Timor began to relax, but the coalition itself began to falter. There are several reasons why it began to weaken at that particular time. In the first place, attempts by the two major parties to consolidate and expand their influence imposed strains on the coalition relationships. UDT appears to have become alarmed at the growing strength of Fretilin, and in particular at the revolutionary fervour of its left-wing, which included several radical students who had returned from Portugal, some of whom began working in the villages. Available information suggests that very few members of Fretilin's left were actual members of the Communist Party. The Party's radicalism seems to be more populist and nationalist than ideological in character. There seems little doubt that the Indonesians added to these apprehensions when the UDT leaders subsequently visited Jakarta. When the Chairman, Lopez da Cruz, and the Vice-Chairman, Mousinho, visited Australia from Jakarta, they informed the writer that Indonesian officials with whom they had spoken (who included Ali Moertopo and General Surono) had all stressed the dangers of Communism. It was reportedly suggested that Timorese leaders link up with with Apodeti the party in favour of integration with Indonesia, to form a common front against Communist subversion. Thus when the UDT leaders arrived in Australia, they were already playing down the importance of their coalition with Fretilin, and even referred to the possibility of establishing an understanding with Apodeti. Indonesian propaganda broadcasts directed at Timor apparently resumed at about the end of May, but henceforth the main targets for criticism were Fretilin leaders and left-wing Portuguese officers... The independence coalition nevertheless survived the initial phase of talks on decolonization which began in Dili on 7th May. At the commencement of the talks the coalition called for an immediate declaration by the Portuguese government of its acceptance of the right of the Timorese people to independence, the setting-up of a transitional government and the formation of an ad-hoc consultative assembly. The coalition also called for elections in October of this year for a

national constituent assembly, whose task would be to work out the constitution for the territory. The independence of Timor was to be proclaimed at a later stage. Some progress appears to have been made at these initial discussions... A second meeting with the venue at Macao was announced to take place in the middle of June.

By the end of May, however, the coalition had collapsed. Fretilin appeared to have moved to a more radical position, emphasising the importance of establishing links with revolutionary groups in metropolitan Portugal and other colonies in the process of decolinization. The party's leaders began to emphasize the need to muster mass suport in the villages and for the leaders themselves to concentrate full-time on political work.

Meanwhile strong opposition to participation with Apodeti in **the Macao talks in June** developed in Fretilin's central committee. Apodeti had not participated in the first phase of talks, but it had agreed to attend the summit talks at Macao. According to Fretilin, it was unthinkable to discuss decolonization with a party committed merely to changing the form of East Timor's colonial status. In the event, only UDT and Apodeti went to Macao.

Fretilin and UDT moved further apart while the latter's contacts with Apodeti improved somewhat.

In spite of Fretilin's boycott, a three day meeting was held at Macao in mid-June attended by UDT and Apodeti. The Conference resulted in the announcement of a constitutional law on the eventual decolonization of Timor. The law provided for elections to be held in October 1976 for a People's Assembly, which would then have the task of drawing up political and administrative statutes for the territory. In the meantime, a Portuguese-controlled government was to be set up, consisting of a High Commission and five Adjutant Secretaries. It was declared that Portuguese sovereignty over East Timor would continue until October 1978, unless otherwise determined by the Portuguese Government and the Timorese People's Assembly. According to one press report (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1st August, 1975) the present Governor, Colonel Lemos Pires, was expected to head the six man transitional government as High Commissioner with the two senior AFM representatives being appointed to two of the senior portfolios.

On the whole Fretilin leaders seem to have treated the Macao meeting as a non-event and to have retaliated with a demand that the Portuguese government immediately declare its intention to grant full independence to East Timor.

Throughout **June and July** it is clear that UDT became increasingly apprehensive at what it believed to be a further shift to the left by Fretilin. On 5 July the "*Indonesian Times*" reported a statement by the Chairman of UDT, Francisco Lopez da Cruz, that there was a possibility of cooperation between his party and Apodeti and that "private contacts leading towards that direction had been made by the leaders of the two parties". In this reported statement, da Cruz said that Fretilin had used "Communist tactics" and that there was "no possibility for any resumed co-operative relationships between Fretilin and UDT in the future."

The rift between Fretilin and UDT presented the Portuguese authorities with a serious obstacle to their plans for decolonization... Although the Administration was on the whole neutral, some officers were partial to UDT or Fretilin. Two of them, Major Maggioli and Capt. Leno, appear to have helped UDT organize its show of strength of August 11th, while other more junior officers went over to Fretilin's cause.

The August 11, 1975 Coup in East Timor

FRETILIN PRESS STATEMENT — Dili, September 13, 1975

On the early morning of August 11, Dili and the whole of East Timor was shaken by the criminal and undemocratic attempt of the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) to seize power. Intelligence sources of the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN) had informed the Central Committee some days earlier that UDT was preparing for a coup to eliminate all FRETILIN leaders ans seize power. FRETILIN warned Portuguese authorities to take the necessary action to prevent such a coup. Long before that many FRETILIN members had been arrested without charge by the Police Chief, Lieut-Col. Maggiolo Gouveia, who later was the commander of UDT military operations.

Until the last hour, Governor Lemos Pires took no action. At 23.45 hours of August 10, exactly 15 minutes for the UDT coup FRETILIN leaders took to the hills. On August 11, the Central Committee of FRETILIN presented the Portuguese authorities with a proposal for talks with the UDT, but with the precondition that the rebels be disarmed. This proposal was ignored by the Governor and military commander, Col. Lemos Pires. Several other proposals were presented in order to avoid direct confrontation between FRETILIN and UDT, but were ignored too. Meanwhile many people, FRETILIN followers, had already been massacred in Maubisse, Same, Turiscai, Aileu, Ermera, Baucau and many other villages. Women and children, as well as students were killed. Villages were burnt. On August 15, 15.45 hrs., the Central Committee of FRETILIN, realising that there was no peaceful resolution, decided to call for armed resistance throughout the national territory. On August 17, 23.30 hrs., the Central Committee had the unconditional support of the military unit at Aileu. On August 18, 1.00 hrs., FRETILIN already had the support of the army unit at Maubisse, in the centre of the island. On August 19, the Central Committee issued a communique addressed to the Timorese troops to be prepared for military action. On August 20, 00.30 hrs., all the army units in Dili, the capital, had joined FRETILIN. Military operations against the enemies of the people began. The following days demonstrated FRETILIN's high support and organisational ability. In a short period of time, the FRETILIN counter-attack was a complete success. Peace and order were restored. (IDOC 06698)

The UDT military commander, Joao Carascalao threw some light on his party's action in a signed statement, dated 18 August. The statement indicates that, at least initially, the UDT leaders planned only a partial seizure of power. It suggests that the "show of strength" was a hastily planned and naive operation which was designed to force moderate Fretilin leaders to negotiate, on UDT terms, action against the former's left-wing, and the setting-up of an anti-Communist national front. Concerning independence Carascalao declared: "We want to be independent but only when we can see that we can support ourselves".

He also wrote: "We definetely want linkage with Portugal because we need their help", although he alleged that the AFM officers, Majors Mota and Jonatas, were helping the left-wing and that their expulsion from Timor was a "great victory" for UDT. The leaders seem to have been confident that their action would have precipitated massive defections from supporters of Fretilin. Indeed some of the latter's members in Dili and the Baucau sector appear to have shifted their support to UDT, but Fretilin loyalties among the Timorese troops appear to have been sustained, which ultimately caused the situation to degenerate into civil war.

The early successes of UDT in establishing control of Dili and Baucau appear to stem from its entrenched position in the civil administration, the apparent connivance of the Chief of Police and the majority of his men, and the restraint exercised by the Portuguese Army officers, who, according to Major Mota, sought to confine the Timorese troops to barracks in order to prevent a civil war from breaking out. In fact, the officers were not long able to restrain the 3,000 or so Timorese troops, most of whom were Fretilin supporters. By 20 August the Timorese troops had left their barracks taking with them arms and equipment, and most joined Fretilin forces in the mountains south of Dili, leading to virtual civil war conditions and a weakening of UDT's position. Under the leadership of one of the Timorese officers, Lieut. Lobato, a brother of the Fretilin Vice-President, the Timorese troops succeeded in capturing Army Headquarters and the munitions store in Dili. A monthafter the action by UDT the fortunes of the parties to the conflict had been reversed, with the area under UDT's control being drastically reduced. By 8 September the main UDT stronghold was Liquica, a small town some 25km west of Dili, where during the Second World War the Portuguese had been interned by the Japanese. The Governor and remnants of the provincial government had earlier been moved from Dili to the small island of Atauro, which lies about 30 kilometres to the north of the capital.

The earlier press reports, which were based largely on accounts by refugees arriving at Darwin, suggested that Dili had been almost destroyed and that casualties ran into thousands, with many atrocities being committed by Fretilin troops. However, it seems that these accounts were, for the most part, gross exaggerations based on the impressions of distresses refugees, most of whom were UDT supporters.

The Situation in September, 1975

Report on a Visit to Portuguese East Timor by Australia Senator Gietzelt and K,L, Fry

This is a brief report of our visit in chronological order. On arrival at Dili on the morning of Tuesday, 16th September, 1975, we immediately met the Central Committee of the Fretilin Party at the Army Headquarters in Dili. The President, Xavier Amaral, gave us a brief outline of the events leading up to the U.D.T. coup which took place on August 1th.

They claimed that many Fretilin followers were killed in the fighting in the coup, and many had been murdered in cold blood after being taken prisoner. The President claimed that any Fretilin supporters who were considered to be Communist, or sympathetic to Communists, were murdered without question. This included a number of students. He was critical of the Governor for not exercising any control over the U.D.T. forces, despite the fact that he was well informed on what was being planned. Pires is generally considered to have collaborated with the U.D.T. He was also critical of the Government's action in leaving E. Timor and going to the island of Aartauro, and particularly his action in forcibly taking with him the only surgeon at the Dili Hospital where hundreds of wounded were awaiting treatment and operations. He also took with him two Portuguese helicopter pilots.

The President stated that the food supplies were being well controlled by the Fretilin Forces, but that they were running short and expected to be out of supplies of staple foods such as rice and flour in four to six weeks. They could not expect relief until the rice harvest in November. People who have come down from the villages to Dili were being sent back to tend their crops, and conditions were favourable at this stage for a satisfactory rice harvest.

The main areas of food shortage were in the north-west highlands, centred around Maubisse. In this area children were also suffering from cold and he requested clothing supplies from Australia if available.

We inspected a large wall map showing the military situation in detail. At that stage, according to the map, Fretilin had full control of the whole of E. Timor with the exception of a small pocket of resistance around Batugade. Here they claimed 40 to 50 U.D.T. supporters were holding a number of Fretilin women and children as hostages in the village, which prevented the surrounding Fretilin forces from firing

on them. It was the Fretilin intention to keep the village under pressure in the expectation that the U.D.T. Forces would ultimately withdraw to Indonesian Timor as most of the other forces along the border had done.

The map showed where U.D.T. Forces along the coast north of Dili at Liquica and Maubara had been evacuated to Indonesian Timor by barge. There had been an action by U.D.T. troops at Bobonato which had been repulsed by Fretilin Forces, who claimed to have killed one soldier wearing Indonesian uniform (Red Berets) and taken two prisoners. Fretilin were awaiting the return of the dead soldier and the prisoners to Dili but they had not arrived before our departure.

It was claimed that the U.D.T. took 20 tractors from the Maliana area. It was also claimed that there had been heavy casualties among the Fretilin Forces in this area – 500 to 5,000. It was not possible to confirm any of these figures but they tend to be refuted by the reports of the doctors of the Dili Hospital that there were only small numbers of wounded evacuated to the hospital from that area.

Following discussions with the Central Committee, we then inspected the jail near the Army Headquarters in Dili where about 80 prisoners were held. These were mainly U.D.T. political prisoners but also included some Fretilin supporters who had been jailed for breaches of discipline and some civil offences. Fretilin claimed that they were holding about 500 political prisoners in all. The jail was crowded but the prisoners generally looked to be in good condition and were being fed the same food rations as everyone else in Dili. A small number of them had obviously been bashed when they were taken prisoner, several bearing body bruises and lacerations and some had head injuries. These people were generally described by Fretilin as being very 'bad' people, who had been responsible for murdering many Fretilin supporters. They included the Chief of Police, Lt. Col. Maggiolo Gouveia.

Fretilin claimed that U.D.T. supporters who were the top administrators and manage the Government Bank, took all the currency with them when they withdrew from Dili. They also claimed that Chinese merchants took all their currency with them. Later the U.D.T. supporters told us that the Bank vault had not been opened and that money was still in the Bank. Whatever happened to the money, it is obvious that there is very little currency in Dili and certainly no-one is being paid, and virtually everyone is being fed by the Fretilin forces.

We then visited the Dili Hospital and spoke with some of the U.D.T. patients there, including the vice President, Mousino, a former Mayor of Dili, who was taken prisoner at Baucau. He told us that when he had visited Australia, with the President of the U.D.T., he had had discussions with Mr Feakes of Foreign Affairs, and Mr Morrison in Canberra, and had spoken to ex Timor commandos and the R.S.L. in Sydney. He stated that he had been encouraged to break the coalition with Fretilin on his return, by people in Australia.

In order to compare the claims of control of the Island made by Fretilin forces, we chartered a private aircraft to inspect a number of widely separated points on the island.

BAUCAU: Our first call was at Baucau, east of Dili, which was a former U.D.T. stronghold. When we arrived at Baucau airport, a platoon of well-dressed Fretilin troops paraded to meet us, accompanied by 200 to 300 of the Baucau people who indicated that they were enthusiastic supporters of the Fretilin Movement. We went to Baucau where several hundred people had gathered.(They too cheered)They too cheered the Fretilin leader, Alerego Fernandez (Secretary-General of the Central Committee) who distributed leaflets containing a message from the Fretilin leadership. We inspected the jail where 58 U.D.T. and 1 Apodeti prisoner were being held. Their quarters were clean and less crowded than at Dili. They were being well fed and, with two or three exceptions, bore no signs of having been bashed. Some of the U.D.T. supporters claimed that they had been threatened and coerced by Mousino to fight against Fretilin. They claimed that Fretilin had always been presented to them as Communists who would murder them if they got control. The Fretilin leaders claimed that some of the U.D.T. political prisoners were being held for their own protection. They had murdered Fretilin supporters whose friends and relatives may seek revenge. The Fretilin leaders claimed at many stages that their philosophy was that independence was more important than revenge and that they constantly impressed this on Fretilin supporters. They claim that as soon as the situation quietened down they would set up a commission to try the prisoners and expected to release as many as possible, and that they would not be seeking the death penalty for U.D.T. leaders. They were hopeful that Portuguese authority would return to help them set up such a commission.

We called at a Catholic school in Baucau where about 20 Catholic priests and lay teachers taught about 1,000 pupils. The disturbances had taken place during the school holidays and it was anticipated that the school would resume normal life when the holidays had ended.

We visited a hospital where we found only five patients and fifteen empty beds. We were given a meal at the Hotel Baucau, which included fresh goat and buffalo meat, as well as locally grown potatoes and tomatoes. There appeared to be no damage

to buildings in Baucau. It was claimed that thirty Apodeti supporters had met at Baucau on 15th September and had made a decision to support the Fretilin administration. We also heard that this had happened in other areas.

VIQUEQUE: We then flew to Viqueque where again we were met by detachments of Fretilin soldiers both at the Airport and at the former Army Headquarters. Here about 30 U.D.T. prisoners were being held, three of whom appeared to have been bashed when arrested. Twenty other U.D.T. supporters who had not been involved in the fighting were being held under house arrest. The U.D.T. prisoners were alleged to have been involved in Fretilin killings in Same and had come to Viqueque for ammunition supplies. There was no actual fighting in Viqueque. At the Administration Headquarters, a large crowd of about 300 Timorese people had gathered and were addressed by Fernandez. He was given a very enthusiastic reception. Viqueque appears to be a very fertile area with cocoanut plantations, paw-paws, tobacco and maize being grown. There was also a cane furniture factory which was sponsored by the Portuguese Government, but which was not in production now.

SUAI: We then flew on to Suai on the south-west coast, only about 30 kilometres from the border with Indonesian Timor. Here we were met by Catholic nuns from a small local hospital, where we were asked to make our aircraft available to take a young woman, who had been haemorrhaging for eight days, to the Dili Hospital. This operation was carried out successfully but delayed our return to Dili where we had to make a hazardous landing with the aid of car-lights on the unlit airstrip.

In Suai we found conditions quiet and orderly, with Fretilin troops in full control. All the Chinese shops in the village were open and none of the Chinese merchants had left the village. They were addressed by the Fretilin leader, who assured them that Fretilin was confident of retaining control and did not want to interfere with their activities.

Suai appears to be a fertile, agricultural area, and on our drive out to the airstrip we saw several groups of Timorese people returning to the township heavily laden with produce from the fields. There had been no fighting in Suai but we saw three houses which had been burnt down and we were told that these were destroyed by Fretilin forces after U.D.T. supporters had withdrawn across the Indonesian border.

Before leaving Dili on Thursday morning, we had further discussions with President Xavier who supplied us with a list of the quantities of foodstuffs which he estimated would be required to see them through until the rice harvest. He stressed that, although they were in virtual control of the island, apart from the need for food and clothing, there was an urgent need for talks with Portuguese representatives with the object of re-establishing a skeleton Portuguese administration in Dili. There was also an urgent need for technical aid. At that stage he had received no response from Portugal to his requests for talks in Baucau on the 20th September. He also stressed the grave economic problems facing them in the virtual absence of currency. He was adamant that Col. Pires would not be accepted back as Governor, as he had been discredited in the eyes of both Fretilin and U.D.T. supporters. He made a very strong plea to us for urgent relief of the impending food shortage.

Summary of General Situation

We received full co-operation from the Fretilin leadership both in our discussions and in our movements around the island.

Our tour around the Island confirmed the claims by Fretilin that they are virtually in full control of the situation. As well as the areas which we visited ourselves we had reports from Aid and Red Cross personnel of a similar situation in the areas which they had visited. Wherever we went, the Fretilin troops appeared to be well disciplined; they were treating their prisoners well and appeared to have the overwhelming support of the local population. There was evidence too that some people who had supported U.D.T. originally had changed sides when Fretilin took control. It was evident to us that statements being released in Djakarta and Ankara whilst we were in Timor, had very little factual basis and should safely be regarded as propaganda.

There is urgent need for food, particularly in the Highlands, north-west of Dili. From our previous visit the population in this area suffered near famine conditions from time to time and this is being accentuated by the current disturbances. We were satisfied that there was no actual fighting taking place while we were in Timor, and that the only position which was not under Fretilin control was Batugade.

We are also satisfied that there is no genuine basis for the charge by the U.D.T. forces that Fretilin is a Communist controlled or dominated organisation. The only evidence we have had of Communist influence is from a small number of students who are said to have Communist associations in Lisbon. At least some of these were murdered by U.D.T. forces during the coup. We are satisfied from discussions with Fretilin leaders that there has been very little outside influence on their general philosophy or their strategic or tactical approach to their plans for independence for E. Timor. It is obviously a self-generating concept of revolution for independence based on a surprisingly well-developed political consciousness of the desire for independence by the Timorese people at large. Their leadership im-

pressed us as being moderate, highly responsible, dedicated and intelligent in their approach. To attribute their success so far to outside influence would, in our opinion, be a grave error of judgment and a misconception of the over-riding grass roots desire for independence from colonial overlords by the indigenous Timorese people and their leaders.

(IDOC 06696)

Fretilin Policy Statement

Dili, September 16, 1975

The Central Committee of FRETILIN held a special meeting of September 16, 1975, called by the Secretary-General of the Political Committee, Jose Ramos-Horta, to debate matters of internal and external policy. The meeting, held in the FRETILIN Army Headquarters in Dili, was presided over by the President Francisco Xavier do Amaral, Vice-President Nicolau Lobato, Secretary-General Alaxio Fernandes and by the Military Commander Rogerio Lobato and the Second Military Commander Hermenegildo Alves.

Following this meeting, the Central Committee considered as Party policy the following points:

1. The affairs of East Timor must be decided by the Timorese people within national territory, without external pressures. FRETILIN still recognises Portugal's sovereignty over East Timor and seeks talks with the Portuguese Government's representatives on September 20, 1975, in Bacau (East Timor).

2. The Central Committee of FRETILIN would welcome a joint peace force by East Timorese troops and Indonesian troops to jointly control the border areas, to avoid any mis-understandings and unnecessary conflicts. The Central Committee believes this peace force must be of equal numbers on both sides. It is imperative that it starts immediately.

3. The Central Committee of FRETILIN would welcome a joint conference with representatives from Portugal, Australia and Indonesia, and the leaders of East Timor in order to eliminate rumours and misunderstandings and to promote friendship and co-operation amongst the people of the region.

4. The Central Committee of FRETILIN welcomes fact-finding missions from ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nationas) Australia and New Zealand as well as observers from other nations and the press, to assess the situation in East Timor, which is now fully controlled by FRETILIN.

5. The Central Committee of FRETILIN believes that regional stability is of utmost importance for the development of the South East Asian nations, therefore, now and in the future, we will strive to promote friendship and co-operation between ourselves and the countries of the region.

6. The Central Committee of FRETILIN considers that ASEAN is a factor of stability and a driving force of regional co-operation. East Timor would greatly benefit from integration into ASEAN after independence.

7. In addition, FRETILIN believes that close co-operation with the countries of the Pacific region, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Papua-New Guinea along with ASEAN will greatly contribute to the development and progress of East Timor and the political stability of the whole region.

8. The Central Committee of FRETILIN believes that the development of East Timor will depend greatly on foreign capital. We therefore welcome foreign investments, provided that the superior interests of the people of East Timor are safeguarded.

9. The Central Committee wishes to stress strongly once again that the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor is a front for national liberation that unites all Timorese nationalists without discrimination of race, religion or political belief.

10. The Central Committee of FRETILIN declares that its foreign policy is based on independence and non-alignment.

With peace and order restored in East Timor, FRETILIN is striving to return the country to normality and we hope that the coming talks with the Portuguese Government's representatives will enable an orderly and peaceful process of decolonisation and development of independance.

The war has left behind it countless problems and FRETILIN appeals again for humanitarian aid from Government and non-Government organisations as a matter of urgency.

FRETILIN CENTRAL COMMITTEE
IN DILI, EAST TIMOR, SEPTEMPER 16.
Francisco Xavier do Amaral,
President.

(IDOC 06698)

Indonesia is Fighting in Timor

The Indonesian government has continued to deny that its forces are involved in fighting in East Timor. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that they are involved.

Indonesian training and arming of anti-FRETILIN forces has been operating for some time. Hamish McDo-

nald claims that by September, officials in Jakarta were making little secret of the fact that they were supporting anti-FRETILIN forces ("*The Age*" Melbourne Sept. 15, 1975). Michael Richardson in Atambua – a major town in Indonesian Timor close to the border – reports that Indonesian commandos are training anti-FRETILIN forces ("*The Age*" Sept. 23, 1975). Informed sources are quoted in a report from Jakarta as saying that Brig. Gen. Pranoto, military commander for the Timor region, had authorized the arming and training of UDT/APODETI supporters ("*The Age*" October 3, 1975).

The first indication of direct Indonesian troop involvement came with a cable to the United Nations by FRETILIN claiming that "foreign troops" had moved 20 km. into East Timor ("*The Age*" September 11, 1975). A few days later FRETILIN claimed that troops wearing Indonesian uniforms and a helicopter were operating on the south coast of East Timor ("*The Age*" September 22, 1975). FRETILIN forces captured an Indonesian soldier 40 km. inside the East Timor border. He was a member of a battalion normally stationed in Java. ("*The Age*" September 23, 1975). This soldier has been interviewed by Australian journalists. A week later, A.A.P. quoted informed sources in Jakarta as saying that Indonesian troops launched an attack on a FRETILIN base in the Aditu district of East Timor near the bordder. ("*The Sun*" Melbourne. October 1, 1975).

Early in October Michael Richardson reported official sources in Jakarta as saying that in addition to arming and training, Indonesia is providing 'advisers' to anti-FRETILIN troops in across-the-border combat ("*Sydney Morning Herald*" October 9, 1975). At the same time FRETILIN had claimed that Indonesia had supported a big attack on Batugade involving planes, helicopters and shelling from a frigate off the coast ("*The Herald*" Melb. October 8, 1975). This was denied by Indonesia. The National Times (October 13-18, 1975) carried a report that Australian officials believe the attack was led by Indonesians and that according to intelligence reports, a DC3 Dakota and a B25 Mitchell bomber were used. The presence of these planes in Indonesian Timor has been confirmed. Bruce Wilson reports that the B25 bomber makes daily flights towards the east from Kupang, capital of Indonesian Timor. ("*The Herald*" Melbourne November 5, 1975).

Indonesia's opposition to observers reaching West Timor, let alone the border area ("*The Herald*" Melbourne Nov. 5, 1975) proves they have something to hide. Jakarta's continued talk of the need for a restoration of peace in East Timor is absurd, It is chiefly because of Indonesia's direct involvement in the present fighting that peace does not exist now!

(from Timor Information Service, 11 November, 1975 – IDOC 06717)

Other Documentation on E. Timor

Timor-Leste: Dados sobre a situaçao colonial, Lisbon, Portugal, CIDAC (Centro de Informaçao Anti-Colonial), *Africa em luta,* February 1975, in Portuguese, 2 pp. – Background information on E. Timor; the Portuguese administration after the 25 April 1974 fall of colonialist regime in Lisbon (IDOC 01456).

Grant Evans, *Timor: Half an island up for grabs,* Melbourne, Australia, *The Digger,* 3 December 1974, in English, 4 pp. – The respective positions of the three major political formations in E. Timor: Fretilin, UDT and Apodeti (IDOC 00682).

Oost-Timor, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Angola Comité, *Angola Bulletin,* May 1975, in Dutch, 11 pp. – History and economy of E. Timor; the political parties; Fretilin's positions concerning education and agricultural cooperatives; the threat of Indonesian intervention and the situation in the island up to January 1975 (IDOC 02568).

Robin Osborne, *Tiny Portuguese Outpost Braces for Freedom,* San Francisco, Ca., USA, *Pacific News Service,* 17 March 1975, in English, 8 pp. – The three options for Timorese future: Portugal, Indonesia or independence; the Fretilin positions (IDOC 01656).

Timor assusta a Indonésia e a Austrália, Lisbon, Portugal, *Expresso Revista,* 12 April 1975, in Portuguese, 8 pp. – Indonesian and Australian position on the decolonization of E. Timor; interview of Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik; the Australian action group "Campaign for Independent East Timor" (IDOC 01991).

Patrice De Beer, *Une obsession: Timor Portugais,* Paris, France, *Le Monde,* 5 November 1975, in French, 2 pp. – How the problem of E. Timor obsesses Indonesia's daily life (IDOC 09114).

Manual e programa politicos, Dili, E. Timor, Fretilin (Frente Revoluvionária de Timor-Leste Independente), 1974, in Portuguese, and Tetum, 45 pp., excerpts in English, 7 pp. – Short and long term program of Fretilin; political manual for cadres and militants (IDOC 01343 in Portuguese and Tetum; 00942 in English).

Press Conference given by the Vice-President of Fretilin on May 29th 1975 at Casa dos Timores in Lisbon, Portugal, in English, 7 pp. – The weakening of the Fretilin UDT coalition because of class divisions; the Portuguese action group "Committee of Fretilin Action" (IDOC 03198).

Timor, Lisbon, Portugal, Ministry of Social Communication, *Portugal Informaçao,* July 1975, in Portuguese, 2 pp. – The Macau summit of June 1975 (IDOC 06318).

A Fretilin e a UDT provocaram a guerra civil em Timor, Lisbon, Portugal, *O Seculo*, 22 August 1975, in Portuguese, 4 pp. – The civil war in E. Timor, August 1975; interview with Major Mota, Portuguese officer in Timor, at the Radio-Television of Portugal (IDOC 05937).

Patrice De Beer, *La fin sans gloire d'une colonisation*, Paris, France, *Le Monde*, 30 August 1975, in French, 2 pp. – Testimonies of refugees from E. Timor arriving at Darwin, Australia, in August 1975 (IDOC 05589).

Press Statement, Dili, E. Timor, Fretilin, September 1975, in English, 2 pp. – Report of the fighting between Fretilin forces and Indonesian troops in the territory of E. Timor (IDOC 06698).

Indonesische invasie op Oost-Timor Begonnen, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Angola Comité, *Angola Bulletin*, October 1975, in Dutch, 2 pp. – The August 11, 1975 coup by UDT; the Indonesian interference; how Fretilin has been the object of a campaign of lies in the international press during the last months (IDOC 06470).

John Edwards, *Timor, A New Vietnam?*, Melbourne, Australia, *The National Times*, 4 October 1975, in English, 9 pp. – The situation in E. Timor; eye-witness report from an Australian journalist (IDOC 06697).

D O C U M E N T A T I O N

The IDOC-Rome Documentation Department has on file one copy of the texts listed and annotated Photo copies can be ordered from IDOC-Rome; price: 100 lire (= $ 0.17 USA) per photocopy page, plus postage.

LATIN AMERICA

The following documentation review on Latin America has been prepared in answer to the appeal made by the Bertrand Russell Tribunal II on repression in Latin America (see Idoc Bulletin n. 37). It follows and fills up the documentation published in the June 1975 issue of the IDOC Bulletin.

CIA Involvement in the Churches

El "Opus Dei" es acusado de conspirar contra intereses de América Latina, Lima, Perú, *Noticias Aliadas* 28 November 1974, in Spanish, 1 p. Brief report on the alleged relationship between the CIA and the Roman Catholic organization Opus Dei in Latin America (IDOC 01672).

Son éminence la C.I.A..., Paris, France, *Cité nouvelle*, April 1975, in French, 1 p. Extracts from an interview with former CIA agent Philip Agée on CIA involvement in the Church in Ecuador (IDOC 02007).

Les missionnaires américains victimes de la C.I.A., Paris, France, *Informations Catholiques Internationales*, April 1975, in French, 3 pp. Alleged CIA infiltration in Christian organizations in Latin America and CIA utilization of American missionaries to further US imperialist aims (IDOC 03676).

"Non tali auxilio...", London, United Kingdom, *The Tablet*, 2 August 1975, in English, 2 pp. CIA involvement in missionary activities, particularly the case of Fr. Vekemans, a Belgian Jesuit missionary and his alleged use of CIA funds in Chile (IDOC 03811).

Jorge Velez, *Colombia: Autoridades y prensa colombiana denuncian las actividades del "Instituto Linguístico de Verano", instrumento de la CIA*, Bogotà, Colombia, *Inter Press Service*, August 1975, in Spanish, 3 pp. Report on the denunciations by the Latin American press of the activities of the Summer Institute of Linguistics, a US christian literacy missionary organization, working among the indigenous peoples of Latin America; allegations of its CIA ties (IDOC 05787).

Roger Vekemans no ha desmentido públicamente la acusación de sus lazos con la CIA; Piden destitución de sacerdoted vinculados con agencias policiales, Lima, Peru, and Mexico City, *Noticias Aliadas*, 18 September 1975, in Spanish, 4 pp. Reactions to the revelations of CIA connections with the Belgian Jesuit missionary Roger Vekemans (IDOC 06081).

Norman Kempster, *"Recibí $ 5 milliones Clandestinos" revelo sacerdote jesuita*, Lima, Perú, *Noticias Aliadas*, 25 September 1975, in Spanish, 4 pp. Spanish translation of an article published in the *Washington Star* of 23 July 1975 revealing Roger Vekemans CIA connections (IDOC 06357).

Roger Vekemans, ennemi de l'Amerique Latine, Bogota, colombia, *Dial*, 24 September 1975, in French, 4 pp. Open letter by the group "Sacerdotes para America Latina" condemning the activities of the Belgian Jesuit missionary Roger Vekemans and his connections with the CIA (IDOC 06349).